II. To the Initial Arguments

172. [To the first] - To the first initial argument [n.74] I say that many do concede that opposite relations can exist together in the same thing when they say ‘the same thing in the same respect is the principle of acting and of undergoing’. But as to the present purpose there is no need to fall into this difficulty. For no one denies that opposite relations can exist in the same thing according to different foundations, as that a thing is greater in one way and smaller in another, and that with respect to itself or something else. But ‘where’ is different first in this body itself, being above and below through the mediation of this ‘where’ as it is a different foundation. It is not unacceptable, therefore, that a body that has a ‘where’ above and below is above and below. Nor should you wonder that the respect of above and below is founded on a ‘where’, although ‘where’ is a respect; for a respect can be founded on a respect, as was touched on above [nn.123-126].

173. [To the second] - To the next [n.75] I say that relations contrary in genus can very well be present in the same thing according to different foundations, just as the same thing can very well be similar to something in whiteness and dissimilar to the same thing in science. But being near and distant are founded on a body located in place, because the ‘where’ of it is near or distant. Therefore, if there is another ‘where’, it is not unacceptable that near and distant belong to the same body, just as near and distant belong to two ‘wheres’ that belong to that body and are the foundations of the nearness and distance.

174. [Third argument] - To the third [n.76] I say that just as the same temporal thing cannot exist simultaneously in time, that is, be in the same ‘temporality’ (so to say) in diverse times. But if you take ‘simultaneous’ in the antecedent as simultaneous in time and if likewise you take it in the consequent as simultaneous in place, the consequence or proportion does not hold, because simultaneity in time should be compared to the same time in the temporal thing, just as simultaneity in place should be compared to the same place in a located thing. I concede, therefore, that the same placed thing cannot by one locating, that is to say ‘by simultaneity in place’, be in two places simultaneously.

175. But this reasoning can lead to the opposite conclusion, albeit sophistically, as follows: the same placed thing existing simultaneously, that is, existing in the same place, can exist in diverse times; therefore too, what is simultaneous in time can exist in diverse places. Let them solve this sophism, and they will solve their own argument, if perhaps they reckon there is evidence for it.

176. [Fourth argument] - As to the next argument [n.77], that the same thing would move and be at rest, I say. according to the first of the three propositions [n.129], that since ‘to be moved or at rest in place’ is simultaneous or posterior to the ‘where’, it will vary according to variation in ‘where’, and so it will be able in one ‘where’ to be at rest in place and in another ‘where’ to move in place, because to rest in place here is nothing other than to possess continuously the same ‘where’ as before, and to be moved there is nothing other than to have there different ‘wheres’. But just as it is possible for the same body to have here one ‘where’ permanently and there to have another ‘where’, so it is possible for it to have here one ‘where’ permanently and several ‘where’s successively elsewhere. One must speak in the same way about the parts of the whole, if they come to be instantaneously, that it is possible for all the parts here of the whole to rest in the whole and some parts there to be moved (as the hand or foot), because all these follow the ‘where’ (that is, this ‘where’ or that ‘where’).

177. And if you argue: “therefore as it is in one ‘where’ it could move toward itself as it is in another ‘where’, and so approach the ‘where’ in which it already is. And then it would either expel itself from the ‘where’ it approaches (and then it would be incompossible with itself in ‘where’, just like some other body), or it would not expel itself (and then it would cease to have that ‘where’ by its own power but receive it from the ‘where’ of what is at rest), or it would make itself possessor of the other ‘where’ along with itself (and thus as two bodies together). And similarly, if it were animate it could move itself by repelling or dragging itself, and then the same man could have a thousand ‘wheres’ and produce dances and a very large army in a camp, and do many other things that seem to be wondered at, and also speak and be silent and dispute with himself.” I say that all these things are puerile and come from sense imagination. But if a reason be asked for the things here being dealt with, there is no greater difficulty in a body moving to the ‘where’ in which it is at rest than to any other ‘where’; and then, when it came to that ‘where’, I say that it would expel the same body from the where in which it is resting, unless perchance the acting power by which it had the other ‘where’ ceases to conserve it as it is located in that other ‘where’, and then it will have only the ‘where’ in which it was previously resting; but it did not have this ‘where’ before as the term of its motion. Instead it would cease to be in the ‘where’ it had in its moving. But to have a ‘where’ at all, whether as having it in motion or as in the term of motion, does nothing to vary or multiply the absolutes that exist in reality.

178. Hereby I respond to the points about dance and war and disputation with itself [n.177], because if ‘to speak’ states an act of imagination or intellect, it exists wherever the speaker was. But if ‘to speak’ is formally only the formation of voice through natural or vocal instruments in striking the air, and if indeed there is one air next to the vocal organs in this ‘where’ and another air next to them in another ‘where’, and suppose that the air is the same but that it will be able to move in place here and not there, then voice will be formed in the former air but not in the latter, and the former will speak and the latter will be silent, and the former will hold the tenor part and the latter the fifth.In medieval music the tenor was the part that held the melody, and the fifth was kept steady as a sort of drone. ¹² And the former, being out of the water, will draw in air, and the same as being in water will not be able to take in air, and yet it will not be drowned because its body will be sufficiently cooled elsewhere, in the place where it has the cooling air it has taken in.In ancient and medieval science, the intake of breath was believed to be for cooling the heat coming from the heart. ¹³ So I concede too that as it is in one ‘where’ it will be able to move its body as its body is in another ‘where’, by expelling or drawing it, for the idea of being movable or mover is not taken from it because the body is identical.

179. And if the following argument is made: “It moves, therefore it is not at rest; it is at rest, therefore it does not move; therefore it moves and is at rest simultaneously, and moves and does not move simultaneously,” - I reply that in the case of opposite relations there is no absolute affirmation and negation but only affirmation and negation in a certain respect. It is like the way the following does not hold: “it is similar and dissimilar, therefore it is similar and not similar.” For the antecedents are true if they are understood in respect of diverse things, and that in a particular case; for if it is similar to this it is similar, and if it is dissimilar to that it is dissimilar. As the Philosopher argues in Categories 6.5b33-6a11, if something is large relative to this it is large, and if small relative to that it is small. And from this he infers that large and small are not contraries, because the argument would not hold unless ‘large relative to this’ implied large and ‘small relative to that’ implied small. In the same way here: from ‘it is at rest in this ‘where’’ follows ‘therefore it is at rest’, and from ‘it is moved in this way’ follows ‘therefore it moves’. Yet from these affirmations do not follow the other negations, as ‘at rest’ ‘not moving’ ‘moving’ ‘not resting’; rather there is a fallacy of the consequent, because the antecedent is true relative to one of the terms, and the negative consequent is a denial with respect to each.

180. [To the fifth] - To the last argument [n.78] I say that every immanent act that would be in the human body in this ‘where’ would be in it in any ‘where’, although it would not come to be in the latter as it is in the former ‘where’ (more will be said of this in the second article of this distinction, in the second question [nn.275-293]). But whether blood or spirit or the like, which are not of the true form of human nature, would be the same here and there, will be solved when spoken about next [question 3].